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INTRODUCTION

The "American Dream," a term coined in James Truslow Adams's 1931
book, The Epic of America,' is a collection of social ideals rooted in the
very fabric of the United States of America.2 While the definition and
interpretation of the American Dream has varied through its long history,
at its core, the American Dream has always stressed "egalitarianism [and]
material prosperity." 3 One of the central features rooted in the modern

1. JAMES TRUSLow ADAMS, THm EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1931).
2. See generally JIM CULLEN, Ti- AMERICAN DREAM: A SiHor His-roizy OI- AN
1IDEA THAT SIIAPED A NATION (2003) (giving a history of how the American Dream
evolved over the course of time and how it influences and affects the United States of
America).
3. American dream, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/american%20dream (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (defining the American Dream as "an
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American Dream ethos is the ability of a citizen to own and control real
property.' This idea of homeownership has become so entrenched in the
American psyche that it has effectively become a "presumed right and
privilege" and has "embedded [itself] in the American consciousness." 5
However, the question that remains for the government to answer is, "If
ownership of real property is vital to American wealth and prosperity,
how should we govern and protect the ability to acquire it?"
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the large piece of legislation passed on July 21, 2010, Public Law 111-203, known as The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
and the massive regulations it has spawned, will actually provide consumer protection in the realm of real estate and homeownership, or
whether the legislation will prevent a large portion of the American population from attaining the American Dream as a result of a system that
makes it nearly impossible to qualify for mortgage loans. 6
Although its stated purpose is to "promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American Taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices, and for other purposes"' it is clear that Dodd-Frank, while addressing some of the excesses in the last housing boom and bust, will
likely cause many more problems than it has solved, particularly for minorities and the lower and middle class populations of the United States.8

American social ideal that stresses egalitarianism[,] especially material prosperity"). See
generally CULLEN, supra note 2 (highlighting ability for Americans to climb out of obscurity and climb social and economic ladders).
4. See JuiE B. ISAACS, ISABEL V. SAWI-LL, & RON HASKINS, GET-ING AllEAD OR
LOSING GROUN: ECONOMIC MOIIrY IN AMERICA 50 (2008) available at http://www
.brookings.edu/-/media/ResearchlFiles/Rcports/2008/2/economic%20mobility%20sawhill/
02_economic mobility-sawhill.pdf (stating that housing is central to the wealth of most
Americans); see also Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, from 1983 to
1998 (2000), reprinted in ASSETS FOR T-1E POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING AssET

OwNERSIMr 34, 47 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001) (claiming sixty
percent of the total assets of middle-class Americans are held in owner-occupied homes);
CULLEN, supra note 2, at 136 (describing the American Dream of homeownership as one
with the widest appeal and application while being extraordinarily resilient and versatile).
5. Michael A. Stegman et al., Home ownership and family wealth in the United States,
in HOUSING ANi) FAMILY WEALTHI-: COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSPEClvi7S

86, 86

(Ray Forrest & Alan Murie eds., 1995).
6. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (stating that one of the purposes of the act is to "protect consumers from abusive financial services practices").

7. Id.
8. See U.S. Di'r

OF Hous. & URBAN Div., AN ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE REFI-

NANCING, 2001-2003, at 2 (2004) available at www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Mortgage
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Part I of this article will provide a brief history of the events that gave
rise to the enactment of Dodd-Frank.' Part II will provide an analysis of
the salient parts of the Ability-to-Repay Standard and Qualified Mortgage Standard. Part III will examine the disparate impact the Ability-toRepay Standard creates for minority and lower income consumers. Part
IV will examine some of the major legal implications of Dodd-Frank. Finally, Part V will include a modest set of proposed solutions and revisions
to improve the regulations.o The effects of other parts of Dodd-Frank
that relate to the housing market, such as the appraisal regulations, the
loan servicing regulations, modification of RESPA procedures, etc., will
be left for others to explore.
II.

HISTORICAL EVENTS AND CAUSES FOR THE DODD-FRANK WALL

STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

A.

ACT

The Housing Bubble and its Burst

Between the years 1997 and 2009, the housing market went through an
unparalleled cycle of expansion and contraction. National nominal home
prices rose approximately one hundred eighty-eight percent before proceeding to fall roughly thirty-three percent from that peak by 2009."
Many of the significant players in the U.S. financial system, all of whom
were trying to benefit from the historic boom in the housing sector, had
been drawn into various mortgage related activities. Consequently, when
the housing market began its collapse, according to Thomas F. Siems, senior economist and policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
it sparked the "longest and deepest economic contraction . . . since the
Great Depression."12
The cause of the housing bubble is hotly contested among experts.13
Various reasons for the housing bubble range from:

Refinance03.pdf (noting that although Americans have taken advantage of refinancing for
lower interest rates, minorities have "continue[d] to rely disproportionately on higher-cost
subprime loans").
9. Provisions and regulations with respect to other aspects of Dodd-Frank-such as
wall street reform, credit for purposes other than consumer housing, or banking and "too
big to fail" provisions-exceed the scope of this article and will not be examined.
10. The solutions and revisions are by no means an exhaustive list and are included to
give the reader some "food for thought."
11. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEo.
L.J. 1177, 1179 (2012).
12. Thomas F. Siems, Branding the Great Recession, FIN. INSIGires, May 31, 2012, at 1,
3, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/banking/firm/fi/fil201.pdf.
13. See generally Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11 (giving an in-depth explanation of
various theories for the bubble and providing the authors' own theory to add to the
multitude).
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[A] lack of regulation to too much regulation; from political pressure
on banks to extend mortgages to unqualified buyers; to the greed of
extravagantly compensated and arrogant Wall Street financiers who
created exotic financial instruments designed to avoid capital requirements and attain extreme leverage; from conflicts of interest on
the part of appraisers, auditors, and rating agencies, to incompetent
regulators; and from the greed of homeowners to the greed of
lenders.14
While experts will argue for years to come over the finer points of what
caused the most recent housing bubble, an expansion in the housing segment of an economy is ordinarily attributable to both particular economic
conditions and changes within the industry itself.'" The particular economic conditions usually needed to create an expansion of a housing market include a significant drop in interest rates,1 6 an increase in home
prices," and an increase in the volume of refinancing of home mortgage
loans." Thus, when the deterioration of credit standards and lending
practices took place in the mortgage industry from 1996 to 2007, it created a perfect storm of low interest rates, increases in housing prices, and
frequent refinancing transactions that created the overheated American
housing market bubble.' 9
With the advent of "easy credit" and no required documentation or
verification, some joked the only test to qualify for a loan at this time was
the ability to fog a mirror, the 2003-2008 housing boom created a significant market of loans for less-than-average borrowers, referred to as the
subprime market. 20 The American subprime market generally consisted

14. Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause

and Effect, 35 U. DAYI-ON L. REV. 33, 34-35 (2009).
15. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6410 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
16. See U.S. DEP'r OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 8, at 2 (stating interest rates
dropped more than twenty percent from 2001-2003).
17.

See U.S.

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL

CRISIS

INQUIRY REPORT:

FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND

ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TIHE UNITED STATEs 156, 156 (2011), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (asserting home prices increased about one hundred fifty-two percent between 1997 and 2006).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DIv., supra note 8, at 1 (declaring the volume
of refinanced loans went from 2.5 million in 2000 to more than 15 million by 2003).
19.

See

KATALINA

M.

BIANCO, TIE SuInPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES ANi) EF-

FECTS OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 6-8 (2008), available at http:/Ibusiness.cch.com/
bankingfinance/focus/news/subprime-wp-rev.pdf (explaining the rise of the subprime
credit market).
20. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410 (noting the growth of subprime lending products and the
"steady deterioration of credit standards in mortgage lending" during the mid-2000s).
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of what was known as Subprime and Alternative A Paper (Alt-A) products. These products were particularly attractive to both creditors and
consumers who faced problems getting loans. Because consumers could
qualify with poor or no credit history, they required little or no documentation of income or capability to repay, they were usually more expensive
in the long term than prime mortgages, and they often had very low introductory rates that increased significantly above prime within a short period of time.21 These products were so attractive to financial institutions
that in 2003, subprime and Alt-A origination volume was $395 billion and
by 2006 the origination volume reached $1 trillion-a 153.2% increase. 2 2
Subprime and Alt-A mortgage products, however, are just that: below
prime and alternatives to other less-risky lending products.23 These types
of loans are usually given out to high-risk borrowers and include suspect
features such as higher than average cost deferral, higher than prime interest rates, significant fees, and interest rate fluctuation, resets, and adjustments. 2 4 Before the market crash, Subprime and Alt-A mortgage
product interest rate resets and adjustments were not viewed as presenting a significant risk to the housing market as long as the housing prices
continued to increase; it was believed that consumers could always refinance their existing loans with relative ease if they began to face
problems making a payment. 2 5 However, as any grade-schooler can tell
you, what goes up, must eventually come down, and when housing prices
began to decline in 2005, refinancing became more difficult, and delinquency and foreclosure rates on the subprime mortgages began to rise.2 6
The decline in home prices continued, and during 2007 and 2008, the
United States experienced the worst decline in home sales in twenty
years. 2 7 By 2009, America's average home prices dropped twenty-eight
percent from their 2006 peak. 2 8 Some cities saw as high as a fifty-five

21. Id.
22. Inside Mortg. Fin., Mortgage Originations by Product: 1990-2010, in 1 Tm 2011
MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 20, at 4

(2011).

23. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. Riv. 1073 (2009) (describing the Alt-A market as "covering
'medium risk' loans between subprime and prime").
24. See generally id. (discussing the "suspect features" subprime mortgages generally
have and stating Alt-A products have similar features).
25. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410.
26. See U.S. FIN. CRIsIs INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 17, at 215-17 (describing how
the decline in housing prices reported by the National Association of Realtors impacted
the rate of defaults and foreclosures).
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id.
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percent drop in home prices. 2 9 This sharp decline had disastrous effects
on those consumers with subprime or Alt-A loans who were unable to
refinance their mortgages, which forced many people into delinquency.30
Between 2007 and 2009, the peak of the housing crisis, an estimated 2.5
million foreclosures had been instituted." Policymakers became concerned that the losses on subprime mortgages would destabilize the entire
mortgage market.3 2
The consequences of delinquencies on individual homeowners and
their neighbors are severe.33 These economic consequences become even
more troubling when foreclosures are concentrated in one geographical
location. 3 4 Communities with high foreclosure rates experience a reduction in home prices for all properties located within that area, whether
the loans were in good standing, default, or foreclosure." With a drop in
housing values, less tax revenues were collectable from property taxes,
further pinching government programs.3 ' Crime in areas with a significant number of foreclosures increased, and homeowners who otherwise
could afford to make their mortgage payments determined it was in their
best economic interest to default (i.e. a "strategic default"), rather than

29. Id.
30. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410 (giving statistical data to show that due to the fall in home
pricing, subprime and Alt-A borrowers showed significant delinquency rates both at the
early default stage and serious delinquency stage).
31. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., FORECLOSURES BY RACE AN) ETI-INICITY:
THIE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CIsis 2 (2010), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf.
32. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OP-rioNs FoRt RESPONDING TO SHORT-TERM EcoNOMIC WEAKNESs 23 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/89xx/doc8916/01-15-econ stimulus.pdf (discussing the role policymakers could play
in helping the housing market "cope with the aftereffects of the end of the housing boom"
in light of the fact that "[p]olicymakers cannot undo all those losses, and attempting to do
so would reward the excessive risk taking, which could encourage excessive risk taking in
the future, and shift the losses from borrowers and lenders to taxpayers").

33. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522, 44524 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (stating homeowners in default face the possibility of foreclosure, loss of
accumulated home equity, higher credit rates, and reduced access to credit); see Michael G.
Bradley et al., Strategic Mortgage Default: The Effect of Neighborhood Factors, REAL EsTATE ECON. (forthcoming Nov. 2013) (manuscript at 18), available at http://www.urban
.org/events/upload/Bradley-Cutts-Liu-Strategic-Default_ 1-3-13 final.pdf (asserting when
a borrower enters into foreclosure, it further "affects the well-being of surrounding
homeowners").
34. See generally Bradley et al., supra note 34, at 18 (discussing the extent of the affects of foreclosure on the encompassing neighborhood).
35. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44524 (explaining the clustering of foreclosures
hurts entire communities by reducing the property values).
36. Bradley et al., supra note 34, at 18
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The
pay on a loan for a property that was worth less than the loan.
inability to access vanishing equity in their homes to start businesses and
pay other debt, finance educations, refinance houses, and the lack of buying power for durable goods all became evident.3 An estimated $7 trillion of household wealth was lost between 2007 and 2009,"3 a period that
became known as the "Great Recession." 4 0
Another factor in the increased levels of default, delinquency, and foreclosure were the increased securitization of mortgages and their movement prior to and during the housing bubble that lowered the cost of
money for loans and for which the loan originator retained no "skin in
the game." 4 1 Originally pioneered by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae 4 2 and Freddie Mac,4 3 "securitization of mortgages" refers to the pooling of various mortgages with credit risks ranging
from excellent to high risk.4 4 The originator, the person or entity that
owns the assets, makes the loan and then places the assets into a specialpurpose corporation, pool, trust, or other appropriate legal entity. 45
Shares or ownership interest in these newly created legal entities are then
sold on the capital markets.4 6

37. Id.
38. Cristian deRitis, Lasting Consequences of the Home-Equity Bust, Moocov's ANALYTics (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.economy.com/dismal/article-free.asp?cid=225309&src
=ma.
39. Bo. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FiD. RESERVE Sys., Tm U.S. HousING MARKET:
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POUCY CONSIDERZATIONs 3 (2012), available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf.
40. See generally Robert Rich, The Great Recession of 2007-2009, FEDIeRAr.RIesi-ve
HISTORY.ORG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/58.
(defining the "Great Recession" as the period between 2007-2009; a time when the real
gross domestic product showed the largest decline since World War 11 and unemployment
peaked at ten percent).
41. See BIANCO, supra note 19, at 8-9 (explaining securitization of mortgages and
citing that there was an increase of twenty one percent in movement of securitized subprime loans to third parties from 2001 to 2006); see also Ability-to-Repay on Qualified
Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6416 (Jan. 30,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (stating creditors increasingly relied on the fees
generated from such loans, and less from the interest rate income received later by the

holder of the loan).

&

42. Fannie Mae is the Federal National Mortgage Association.
43. Freddie Mac is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.
44. Bruce D. Fisher, A Simple Explanation of Some Legal and Economic Aspects of
the FinancialMeltdowns of Banks, MiciI. B. J., Mar. 2010, at 38, 39.
45. See Joseph. C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues, and New Frontiers,69 TEx. L. Riev. 1369, 1377-78 (1991) (explaining how a
basic securitized transaction works).
46. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I STAN. J.L. Bus.
FIN. 133, 134 (1994) (illustrating what needs to be done to sell securitized vehicles on the
capital markets).
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It should be noted, while securitization is cited as one of the many reasons the United States stumbled into the predicament that produced the
"Great Recession," securitization is not inherently evil; in fact, securitization is one of the most efficient ways to allocate risk and create capital.4 7
This is because the risks (and rewards) of such investments can be spread
to other investors in the capital markets, instead of concentrating the
risks of default in only the originating lender and its shareholders.4 8
While a diverse allocation of risk may appear to be sound economic
practice, the subprime mortgages may be a flawed asset type that should
not be securitized.4 9 Even though securitization allowed many people to
realize the American dream of owning their own home, in practice the
result from the actual sale of these products in the early 2000s amounted
to a proverbial game of hot potato. The securitized vehicle, acting as the
potato, was passed around as quickly as it could be, with each institutional lender or private investor moving it as fast as they could, collecting
fees in the process, and trying to pass it on to another investor. The unlucky final investor would then deal with the risky investment when the
merry-go-round stopped and there was a default by the consumer, usually
in a foreclosure situation where there was a high likelihood of monetary
losses.5 o Unfortunately, in the end, it wasn't just the investors who participated in the reckless buying and selling of subprime and Alt-A mortgages who lost. An estimated $7 trillion loss of everyday household
wealth can be attributed to this reckless investing," and while distressed
homeownership and foreclosure rates are improving, they still remain at
extraordinary levels.5 2
B.

Initial Government Response to the Financial Crisis Caused by the
Housing Bubble Burst

Congress responded to the deteriorating home and mortgage markets
by enacting The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA),
which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30,
47. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1539,
1553-70 (2009) (explaining in depth why securitization is efficient).
48. Id. at 1566 n.142.
49. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313,
1317-18 (2009) (explaining in-depth why subprime mortgages are a flawed asset type).
50. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, at 1183-84 (explaining how financial institutions were incentivized to securitize as many mortgages as possible, which led to lowering
lending standards, causing a collapse similar to pyramid schemes collapses).
51. Bo. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 40, at 3.
52. See generally CORELOGIc, NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-april2013.pdf (stating that although foreclosures are down twenty-four percent, over 4.4 million
foreclosures took place since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008).
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2008.53 The Act was intended to provide new precautions and increased
regulations on government sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac,54 provide relief for borrowers and lenders dealing with the
effects of the housing crisis, and assist troubled borrowers in the hardest
hit communities by remedying the social consequences of foreclosure. 5
While HERA did provide some relief to families across the country, it
was plagued with party politics and compromises, and its provisions were
not effective to reduce the housing crisis for most American families.56
Congress continued to respond to the deteriorating home and mortgage markets with a second act, The Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP"), 5 embedded in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008.58 TARP's main tool in combating the Great Recession included
programs to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by lowering
monthly payments, working out situations with the homeowner where
they can leave their home without being foreclosed on, assisting the
homeowner with the refinancing process, helping the homeowner get
mortgage relief while looking for employment, and providing support
when the homeowner owes more than the home is worth, etc. 5 9 TARP's
53. See generally Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (stating that the intended purpose of the Act is "[tlo provide needed

housing reform").
54. See FED. Hous.

FIN. AGENCY, THE 2013 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR TimE CONSERVATORSslIe or FANNIE MAE AN) FREDDIE MAC 3 (2014), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/

AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/2014StrategicPlanO5l32014Final.pdf (pointing out
that HERA grants discretionary authority to the Director of the new Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) in appointing the FHFA as conservator or receiver of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac-which the Director exercised on September 6, 2008-placing Freddie
Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship).
55. See generally Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46
HARV. J. ON LUis. 585, pincite (2009) (giving in-depth explanations of the various provisions in the House and Economic Recovery Act of 2008).
56. See John H. Vogel, Jr., Share the Pain: How to Deal with the Housing Crisis, HurFINGTON Posr (Oct. 22, 2008, 03:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-h-vogel-jr/
share-the-pain-how-to-dea b_136937.html (criticizing the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 for having a "brilliant framework" but too many "compromises and contortions" to be workable for most American families).
57. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101-36,
122 Stat. 3765, 3767-800 (2008).
58. See generally id. at 3765 (describing the Act's purpose as giving the Federal Government the authority "[t]o purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the
purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial
system and protecting taxpayers").
59. See Brent Horton & Jack Vrablik, The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP):
Uses and Abuses, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES Pot'y REP. 24, 29 (2010) (discussing how
the Troubled Asset Relief Program uses the Making Home Affordable Program to aid
struggling homeowners); see also About MHA, MAKINGHOMEAFIFORDABLE.Gov, http://

www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/about-mha/Pages/default.aspx
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success is hotly debated and largely depends on broad interpretation of
the goals of the program; however, its unpopularity in most circles remains unquestioned.6 0
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System also responded
to the crisis by revising and adopting new rules under the 1994 legislation,
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)." The
Board's 2008 action extended consumer protections regarding a consumer's ability to repay and prepayment penalties by establishing a new
category of "higher-priced mortgage loans" with lower annual percentage rates (APRs) and made such provisions enforceable by consumers
through civil actions. 62 Certain creditors have been required to follow
these regulations since October 2009.63
Since 2008, the increased market presence of the Federal Housing Administration has resulted in mortgage credit remaining available to at
least some consumers, and stricter regulations have resulted in a marked
decrease in foreclosures.64 However, it has also resulted in a precipitous
drop in mortgages written. Such over-regulation may continue to impact
the economy as investors and lenders continue to rack up losses on their
portfolios of defaulted properties and lose income and assets that could
have been otherwise deployed.
The rise in government involvement in the housing market has also
increased exponentially-to the point where almost all of the loans created today are made with some sort of government assistance.6 5 Today,

(explaining how the Making Home Affordable Program can help homeowners get mort-

gage relief and avoid foreclosures).
60. See Annie Lowery, FinalArguments: Was TARP a Success or Failure?It Depends
on Who You Think it was Supposed to Help, Moneybox, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 3:38 PM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/04/final

arguments.html

(citing a

Bloomberg poll showing twenty-four percent of respondents said TARP was helpful).
61. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522, 44522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (amending Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act

and Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, and establishing new regulatory protections for consumers in the residential mortgage market).
62. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6414 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
63. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (stating the final rule became effective October 1, 2009 "except for § 226.35(b)(3) which [became] effective on April 1, 2010").
64. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6411; see also CoreLogic,supra note 53, at 3 (stating that foreclosures
were down twenty-four percent in 2013 compared to 2014).
65. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6412 (reporting that approximately three out of every four loans
are either bought or guaranteed by government assistance).
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even this government assistance is being attacked from all sides. 66 Mortgage brokers predicted in late 2013 that the drop in year over year mortgages could experience a thirty-two percent decrease in the amount of
money used to write mortgages in 2014.67 The home and mortgage markets remain extremely fragile and people with lower credit scores and less
money to use as a down payment continue to have an extremely difficult
time getting a mortgage, even with the government sponsored
programs.6 8
III.

DODD-FRANK AND THE DISMANTLING AND REBUILDING
OF THE LENDING INDUSTRY

A.

"Cracking Down on Abusive Practices":6 ' The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

As previously mentioned, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) defines its purpose as "[a]n Act
to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to
fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes." 7 0 In the words of President Barack Obama, Dodd-Frank's
purpose is to "crack down on abusive practices." 7 The passage of the
2,300 page piece of legislation fell almost exclusively on party lines 72 and
initiated the largest expansion of government power since the Great De66. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks on Responsible Homeownership
(Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/06/text-of-obama-speech-

on-homeownership (calling for the winding down of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and
supporting bipartisan efforts in the Senate to end both programs).
67. Scott Reckard, Mortgage refinancing projected to plunge in 2014 as rates rise, L.A.
TiMES (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-mortgage-forecast-20131029,0,5248739.story#axzz2obSSNzUq.
68. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6412 ("The Federal Reserve Board calculates that the share of
mortgage borrowers with credit scores below 620 has fallen from about 17 percent of consumers at the end of 2006 to about 5 percent more recently.").
69. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-andconsumer-protection-act.
70. Compare Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, with Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub.

L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (showing very similar purposes and a need for comprehensive protection for credit based transactions).
71. Obama, supra note 70.
72. See H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, GovTRACK.US, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014)
(reporting that the bill passed in the House with the affirmative votes of 234 Democrats
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pression, touching everything in the finance industry from ATM cards
and fees to Wall Street to home financing." While every part of this
behemoth piece of legislation deserves and requires comprehensive and
meticulous review,7 4 the scope of this article is limited to the analysis of
two very specific parts and their effects on home ownership:" The Ability-to-Repay Standard and the Qualified Mortgage Standard.7 ' These
two parts of the Dodd-Frank regulations constitute the bulk of the regulatory scheme with respect to residential lending, generate the most commentary, and, as shown below, have the greatest effect on the lending
industry and minority and lower income consumers.
The Dodd-Frank Act and the regulations provide two options or standards with which lenders must comply when writing residential loans to
determine if a borrower has a reasonable ability to repay their loan. First,
the regulations provide for at least eight factors the lender must consider
before writing a loan to make a reasonable and good faith determination
that a borrower has a reasonable ability to repay the loan." Second, the
lender could alternatively write what has been termed a "Qualified Mortgage" and obtain either a presumption of compliance or a "safe harbor"
from actions by borrowers against it alleging the lender did not have a

and only 3Republicans; while in the Senate, 55 Democrats voted in favor of the bill along-

side only 3 Republicans and 2 Independents).
73. See Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. FinancialLandscape,
Politics & Policy, WALL Sr. J. (July 16, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-

cles/SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958; see also Obama, supra note 70
(stating the Dodd-Frank Act will "crack down on abusive practices in the mortgage industry . . . mak[ing] sure that contracts are simpler-putting an end to many hidden penalties
and fees in complex mortgages-so folks know what they're signing").
74. See Paletta & Lucchetti, supra note 74 (claiming that the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission asked for $45 million to help it begin to understand and implement its
new regulatory powers and J.P Morgan assembled more than 100 teams to examine the
legislation).
75. The Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage regulations apply to virtually all
closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling including any real property
attached to the dwelling. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under

the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6446-47 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1026) (outlining the minimum standards for transactions secured by a dwelling).
It includes residential structures containing one to four residential units and includes coops and condominiums. Id. at 6446. It is not limited solely to a first lien on a dwelling, but
also to any second or additional lien on the property. Id. However, it does not apply to
open-end credit plans (i.e. home equity lines of credit) time share plans, bridge loans and
construction loans for less than 12 months, mortgages on vacant land or reverse mortgages.
Id. at 6447. Loan modifications are covered only if they are considered a refinancing of the
debt under Regulation Z at section 1026.20(a). Id.
76. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, §§ 1411-12, 2142-48.
77. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6408.
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reasonable belief the borrower had the ability to repay the loan.7 ' Thus,
the Dodd-Frank Act establishes two sets of prerequisites for writing a
residential mortgage: underwriting prerequisites in the Ability-to-Repay
Standard and product prerequisites in the Qualified Mortgage Standard.
B.

The Ability-to-Repay Standard

The first means by which a lender can comply with Dodd-Frank is by
examining certain underwriting characteristics explained in the Abilityto-Repay Standard. These characteristics illuminate personal circumstances of the borrower that signal a likelihood of a future default on the
proposed residential mortgage, as opposed to the terms of the mortgage
or the collateral for the loan.7 1 Section 1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act
broadly establishes the Ability-to-Repay Standard by stating:
In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, no creditor
may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a
reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its
terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.o
While this is a laudable goal, with which no prudent businessperson
would find issue, (except true libertarians who deny government any role
in regulating commerce), the "devil" truly is "in the details." The minimum requirements in the Ability-to-Repay regulations adopted by the
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) require creditors to make
an ability to repay determination on every consumer loan secured by a
dwelling on real property."' To make this determination, the regulations
require lenders to consider at least eight factors as judged against an objective underwriting model.82 The rule does not dictate how these factors
must be considered," but the underwriting model used by lenders must
be "based on empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound

78. Id. at 6408-09.
79. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1411, 2145-46 (establishing the basis for determining the consumer's ability to repay the residential mortgage loan).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6603.
82. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, §§ 1411-12, 2142-48.
83. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410 (explaining that the rules do not dictate that underwriters
must follow a particular model for underwriting residential loans but that, at a minimum,
creditors must generally consider the factors listed).
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models."' These eight factors include: (1) the potential borrower's
credit history; 5 (2) the potential borrower's employment status for the
last two years; 6 (3) the monthly payment for the loan; (4) the monthly
payments on any simultaneous loan;
(5) the potential borrower's
monthly payment for property taxes, insurance, and homeowner's association dues;" (6) the potential borrower's current income or reasonably
expected income or assets (if the consumer will rely on them to repay the
loan);o (7) the potential borrower's current debt obligations including
alimony and child support;" and (8) the potential borrower's debt-toincome ratio or residual income the consumer will have after non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations. 92
Creditors will have to use reasonably reliable third party records to
verify this information9 3 and a lender cannot merely rely on a borrower's
application or statements, 94 even if they are signed and subject to penalties for making false statements. 95 Lenders must retain the evidence of

84. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6603. The lender is instructed to look at the issue of the Ability-toRepay Standards in the context of the facts and circumstances relevant to the lender's
market. Id. While the government does not dictate the model to be used, certain factors
are listed that may show a lender acted in good faith, including that the underwriting standards have historically resulted in low rates of delinquency and default during adverse
economic conditions and the payment history of the borrower-that is, the borrower was
able to repay the loan for a significant period of time. Id. The converse would likely
demonstrate a lack of good faith or reasonableness in a lender's determination. See id. at
6603-04 (discussing the agencies responsibility in ensuring fair lending practices); see also
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ABILrrY-To-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE:
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201401_cfpb-atr-qm-small-entity-compliance-guide.pdf (discussing the agencies responsibility in ensuring fair lending practices).
85. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6607.
86. Id. at 6605.
87. Id. at 6605-6608 (using the introductory rate or fully indexed rate, whichever is
higher, and monthly, fully amortizing payments that are substantially equal).
88. Id. at 6607.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 6605.
91. Id. at 6606-07.
92. Id. at 6607-08; Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2)(vii)
(2014).
93. Id. at 6607-08 (explaining that examples of a reasonably reliable third-party
records include governmental records, HOA and co-op provided records, written lease
agreements, credit reports, court orders, tax returns, W-2 and other payroll statements,
bank statements, check cashing receipts, and remittance transfer receipts).
94. Id. at 6603.
95. See Uniform Residential Loan Application, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae
.com/content/guide form/1003rev.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (stating in Section IX that
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their compliance with the Ability-to-Repay Standard for three years after
the date of consummation of a covered transaction.9 6 The failure to comply with any of the Ability-to-Repay requirements subjects the lender to
certain penalties discussed infra and a lender will be required to demonstrate its compliance in any suit brought by a consumer. 7 In other words,
the burden rests on the lender to show they are in compliance with the
regulations, not on the consumer to show that the lender failed to
comply. 9 8
C.

The Qualified Mortgage Standard

In contrast to facing the risks of suit regarding compliance with the
Ability-to-Repay Standard, a lender could write a Qualified Mortgage.9 9
A Qualified Mortgage relates to the prerequisites of the terms of the loan
and only tangentially touches on the borrower's Ability-to-Repay underwriting characteristics. oo A Qualified Mortgage provides certain protections from litigation, discussed infra, by establishing either a rebuttable
presumption or a conclusive safe harbor, depending on the terms of the
loan and other lender factors.'o' This appears to create an overwhelming
incentive for lenders to write only Qualified Mortgages, since there are
no presumptions or safe harbors for compliance with the Ability-to-Repay Standard.1 0 2
Section 1412 of the Dodd-Frank Act defines "Qualified Mortgage" by
establishing various product-feature prerequisites and affordability un-

the undersigned (borrower) acknowledges that everything in the document is correct
under punishment of fine or imprisonment).
96. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
97. See id. at 6416 (stating Dodd-Frank creates special remedies for violations of the
ability-to-repay requirements including special statutory damages unless the creditor can
demonstrate their failure to comply was not material).
98. Id. at 6416.
99. Technically a lender is deemed to be in compliance with the Ability-to-Repay requirements if they write a Qualified Mortgage, but since the Qualified Mortgage Standard
has very little to do with the characteristics of a borrower, it is actually a second alternative
standard for lenders to meet to comply with the requirements of Dodd-Frank. See id. at
6418 (reflecting changes made by the Dodd-Frank Act and how the Act consolidated the
rulemaking authority for consumer financial laws).

100. Id. at 6409.
101. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
102. Id. at 6408; see also id. at 6505 (noting the CFPB considered that depending on
the definition of a Qualified Mortgage, the regulation could curtail access to credit and
create a "straightjacket setting the outer boundary of credit availability").
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derwriting requirements.' 0 3 The regulations provide for additional requirements and provide for certain exceptions of the requirements based
upon the location of the lender, its size, and the number of loans it writes
annually.1 0 4 Generally, a Qualified Mortgage cannot be a loan with negative amortization, have interest-only payments, have a balloon feature, or
exceed thirty years, and must provide for substantially equal regular periodic payments."0 s Additionally, a Qualified Mortgage is limited in its interest rate and prepayment penalties, and requires a lender to verify
assets and income of the borrower and meet certain income to debt
ratios.106
i.

No Negative Amortization

A loan with negative amortization-a loan in which periodic payments
are not sufficient to pay at least the accrued interest and thus the principal is ever increasing-has obvious ramifications and risk that at some
point the principal amount due may prove to exceed the value of the
collateral.' This would have the effect of providing homeowners with
an incentive to merely walk away from their property. While the use of
these loans have never been very prevalent in the market, they were written with the intention of having them paid off within a short time of their
origination, into a more traditional loan.tos When housing prices were
rising significantly, or interest rates dropping significantly, there was usually little problem in refinancing these loans. However, once the values
stopped rising or interest rates increased, the homeowner would not be
able to refinance and would need to take steps to convert the negative
amortizing loan into one that would amortize (that is pay off), usually by
adding to their interest payment some amount to cover all of the accrued
interest and a portion of the principal. For most consumers, this calcula103. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1412, 2145-46; see also Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6409 (discussing
the presumption for Qualified Mortgages provided by the Dodd-Frank Act).
104. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PRor. BUREAU, An.,rrY-ro-REPAY AN) QUALIEo MORTGAGE RuLE: SMALL ENTITy COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 84 (discussing the
requirements used by the creditor in determining whether the consumer has the ability to
repay the loan and the factors that are exempt from the ability-to-repay requirement).
105. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
106. Id.
107. See CONSUMER FIN. PRor.

BUREAU, WHAT IS NEGATIVE AMORTIZATION? http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/103/what-is-negative-amortization.html
(last visited

Sept. 1, 2014) (defining "negative amortization" and highlighting risks).
108. Jessica Bosari, The State of Negatively Amortizing Loans, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2012,
5:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneywisewomen/2012/09/20/the-state-of-negative

ly-amortizing-loans.
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tion was out of their reach, and the neighborhoods where these loans
were concentrated faced consistently higher foreclosure rates.1 0 9
ii.

No Balloon Features

A relatively common lender practice is to use balloon payment mortgage. This lending vehicle requires the borrower to 'refinance' or otherwise come up with funds to pay off the loan at the conclusion of time
period, usually five to ten years."o The practice was implemented by
lenders to mitigate the long-term interest rate risk, by providing that
lenders would not be stuck with loans written at a significantly lower interest rate than the market at less predictable future times. Without a
balloon and significant interest rate fluctuations, lenders could find themselves locked into a book of loans written at interest rates that were half
or even less than the interest rates on newer loans.
A Qualified Mortgage cannot contain a balloon payment, unless the
interest rate is fixed, the term is longer than five years, and scheduled
payments (without the balloon feature) would fully amortize the loan
over thirty years or less."' The loan must be kept in the lender's portfolio for at least three years or is otherwise sold according to certain limited
exceptions." 2 Obviously, this is an attempt to end the cycle of refinancing "hot potato" experienced during the crisis, when homeowners relied
on the appreciation to refinance into ever-higher loans.
iii.

Thirty Years or Less Amortization

A Qualified Mortgage must be amortizing over thirty years or less and
cannot result in an increase of the principal balance. 3 This may actually
have the effect of restricting the lending market for those borrowers on
the edges, by removing the ability of a lender to extend the payment term
over a longer period of time, thus reducing the monthly payments of a
borrower.

109. See generally BOCIAN IEr AL., supra note 31 (addressing three key questions:
"who has lost their home to foreclosure[;] ...
what kind of mortgages different borrowers
received[;] . . . [and] where the crisis had the greatest impact").

110. See BI..ACK'S LAw DICIlONARY 1102 (9th ed. 2009) (defining balloon-payment
mortgage as "a mortgage requiring periodic payments for a specified time and a lump-sum
payment of the outstanding balance at maturity")
111. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(f) (2014).
112. Id. at § 1026.43(f)(2).
113. Id. at § 1026.43(e)(2).
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Equal Periodic Payments

The payments on a Qualified Mortgage must also be periodic and substantially equal.1 4 This is to combat the perceived difficulties with "rate
shock," which is experienced by borrowers when their interest rates reset
on variable interest rate loans."' A lender could still write a variable
rate loan and have it qualify as a qualified mortgage, but the lender must
qualify the loan by using the highest interest rate possible during the first
five years, as though that rate were in effect from the inception of the
loan.11 6 As a practical matter, with the interest rate restrictions discussed
infra, a variable rate loan would be hard pressed to qualify as a Qualified
Mortgage. Thus the CFPB has essentially eliminated variable rate loans
from the marketplace, at least as to protections of the presumption or a
safe harbor from litigation.
v.

Limited Points and Fees.

Points and fees are limited to three percent of the loan amount for
loans over $100,000.00; for loans between $60,000 and $100,000, $3,000.
total; for loans between $20,000 and $60,000, five percent of the total loan
amount; for loans between $12,500 and $20,000 $1,000, and for loans less
than $12,500, eight percent of the total loan amount."'
vi.

No Prepayment Penalties.

Prepayment penalties are prohibited unless the loan is a fixed rate
loan, penalties are limited to the first three years, and the penalty is less
than two percent for the first two years of the loan and one percent in
year three.1 1 s Additionally, a lender must simultaneously offer a loan
without a prepayment penalty on similar terms.11 9
vii.

Interest Rate Restrictions

Interest rates are also strictly proscribed for a Qualified Mortgage to
no more than 1.5 points higher than the Average Prime Offer Rate

114. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6421 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
115. See id. at 6478 (pointing out that potential payment shock for Qualified Mortgages could diminish if borrowers receive loans they can reasonably repay).
116. See id. at 6409 (establishing the general criteria for Qualified Mortgages requiring the calculation of monthly payments be based on the highest payment, which will apply
for the first 5 years of the loan).

117. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(3) (2014).
118. Id. at § 1026.43(g).
119. Id. at § 1026.43(g)(3).
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(APOR)12 0 for the safe harbor and 3.5 points above the APOR 1 2 1 for the
presumption.
viii.

Asset and Income Verification and Debt to Income Ratio

Finally, a lender is required to verify assets and income 2 2 and the borrower's ratio of total monthly debt to total monthly income may not exceed forty-three percent for a mortgage to qualify as a Qualified
Mortgage. 123
ix.

Exceptions to the Qualified Mortgage Requirements

The first of three exceptions recognized are loans eligible to be purchased1 2 4 or guaranteed by The Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac). 12 5 Loans from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, and the Rural Housing Service also meet the Qualified
Mortgage Standard if they have regular periodic payments, are not negative amortizing loans, and do not exceed thirty years. 12 6 Presumably,
such loans do not need to meet the verification requirements or the debtto-income ratio set out in the regulation. 1 2 7 This exception was designed
to avoid disrupting the market and expires the earlier of January 10, 2021,
when the conservatorship of the Government Sponsored Enterprise ends,
or when the federal agency issues rules to define a qualified mortgage
under its programs. 128

120. Id. at § 1026.35(a)(2).
121. The "average prime offer rate" is defined in TILA section 129C (b)(2)(B) as the
average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction as of the date on which the interest
rate for the transaction is set, as published by the CFPB. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1640(f) (2012).
122. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(2)(v) (2014).

123. Id. at § 1026.43(f)(2).
124. The loan does not actually have to be purchased by the governmental entity; just
that it is eligible for purchase or guarantee. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6617 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
125. Id. at 6617.

126. Id.
127. Note however, that such loans are usually subject to debt-to-income ratios and
other requirements to be written or guaranteed by these agencies. See B3-6-02: Debt-toIncome Ratios, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/selling/b3/6/02
.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (stating different debt-to-income ratios than were issued
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
128. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6617.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol17/iss1/34

20

Torok and Torok: What Happened to the American Dream - An Analysis of the Dodd-Fra

DODD-FRANK'S EFFECT ON HOME OWNERSHIP

2014]

115

The second exception is for loans created by rural, small and community-based lenders. Due to special concerns surrounding these particular
loans, the CFPB eased some of the Qualified Mortgage rules.1 2 9 To qualify as a small lender, a lender must operate predominantly in rural or
underserved areas, and the lender cannot write more than 500 first lien
loans a year and cannot have assets that exceed $2 billion.1 3 0 Fifty percent of the first liens originated by the lender must also be originated in
counties that are rural or underserved as designated by the CFPB.'
The CFPB recognizes much of what occurred in the market was not the
result of lending by small community based lenders.1 32 In fact, the CFPB
notes that the emphasis on relationship banking," 3 the long-term relationship with their customers, and the retention of the loan by the lenders
led to fewer defaults and delinquencies and more accurate underwriting
than the objective standards championed for larger lenders. 1 34 Such
small lenders had limited access to the securitization markets and usually
funded the loans with the deposits held for their customers, rather than
capital from outside sources. 3
Nevertheless, the CFPB decided to include small lenders in its regulations covering all covered transactions, but granted specific exceptions
13
from certain requirements.6
In the first of these, the CFPB adopted
regulations allowing small rural lenders to originate a balloon payment
Qualified Mortgage.1 37 In addition the CFPB raised the maximum interest rate for the safe harbor from 1.5 above APOR to 3.5 above APOR,

129. See CONSUMER FIN. PRor. BUREAU, AmIIrry-To-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RuL: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 8 (stating that in response to special concerns over small creditors, there are special provisions for Qualified
Mortgages held in portfolio by small creditors, including some types of balloon-payment
mortgages).
130. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
131. Id.
132. See generally Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the

Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 35430, 35438 (June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1026) (discussing market-wide data showing significantly lower mortgage loan
delinquencies and charge-off rates at smaller banks than large banks).
133.

See CONSUMER

FIN. Piaor. BUREAU, A3IirrY-To-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MOZr-

GAGE RUi..E: SMALL EN-Iy COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 26 (instructing lenders
that "[w]hether or not you complied with the ATR requirements is based on the information available during origination").
134. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 35438.

135. Id. at 35437.
136. CONSUMER FIN. PRoI-. BUREAU, ABITrrY-To-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RuE: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 84, at 8.

137. Id.
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and the CFPB eliminated the requirement that a borrower's debt-to-income ratio must be forty-three percent or below.' The loans must still
meet the general restrictions on Qualified Mortgages with respect to loan
features and points and fees however, as well as that the lender must
retain the loan in its portfolio for at least three years.'
The CFPB also permitted small lenders a temporary two-year transition period in which they can write balloon payment mortgages that qualify as a Qualified Mortgage, so long as the creditor retains the loan in its
portfolio for at least three years (or transfers it to another small creditor), 14 0 writes no more than 500 first lien covered transactions per year,
and has less than $2 billion in assets. 14 1 Small creditors are not however,
limited for the two-year period to rural or underserved areas, as they
were under the previous regulation.'14 2
Finally, in an attempt to remove some of the burdens that certain organizations would have faced under the Ability-to-Repay Standard, the
CFPB provided an exemption from the Ability-to-Repay requirements of
Dodd-Frank for loans made by certain lenders designated by the U.S Department of the Treasury as Community Development Financial Institutions or designated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development as Community Housing Development Organization or a
Downpayment Assistance Provider of Secondary Financing.1 43 Additionally, creditors that are designated as non-profit under IRC 501(c)(3) and
write less than 200 loans a year, provide credit only to low to moderate
income consumers, and follow their own guidelines to determine the borrower's ability to repay the loans are also exempt from the Ability-toRepay requirements of other lenders.1 4 4
ix. The Importance of Complying with The Ability-to-Repay Standard
and Qualified Mortgage Standards: Gaining a Safe Harbor or Rebuttable
Presumption and Avoiding Harsh Penalties
Section 1412(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act states, "Any creditor with
respect to any residential mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan
subject to liability under this title, may presume that the loan has met the

138. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 35431, 35500.
139. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6409 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
140. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 35477.
141. Id. at 35489.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 35430.
144. Id.
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requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage." 1 4 5
However, as the CFPB indicates in its final rule, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not denote whether this presumption creates a safe harbor or merely
creates a rebuttable presumption. 1 46 The CFPB ultimately determined to
adopt both protections with the distinction being whether the loan being
written is a "regular priced" loan or a "high priced" loan.
The CFPB's regulations provide for a safe harbor for loans that satisfy
the requirements of a qualified mortgage and are not "higher priced"
loans, 14 7 while a rebuttable presumption is created for "higher priced"
loans. 148 What this means is that the final rule provided by the CFPB
allows for a consumer to show a violation in regard to a subprime qualified mortgage by demonstrating at the origination of the loan that the
consumer did not have enough residual income or assets to meet living
expenses because their income was too low and their debt obligations
were too high.1 49 It should be noted that the final rule does clarify that
this ability to rebut the presumption is diminished with time as the consumer demonstrates the ability to repay his loan.1 50
One of the reasons that it is important for a creditor to create Qualified
Mortgages and gain the safe harbor or rebuttable presumption is that the
Dodd-Frank Act creates special remedies for violating section 129C(a) of
the Truth in Lending Act, the Ability-to-Repay requirement."5 1 A consumer who brings an action within three years of a Truth in Lending
129C(a) violation may be able to recover damages equal to the sum of all
finance charges and fees paid in addition to actual damages, statutory
damages, court costs, and attorney fees,15 2
Additionally, if a mortgage does not meet the stringent standards set
out in Dodd-Frank, a consumer may assert a violation by the creditor as
matter of defense by recoupment or set off in a foreclosure proceeding.1 5 3
This defense may be raised against any creditor, assignee, other holder of
the residential mortgage loan, or anyone acting on their behalf who initi-

145. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1412, 2145 (emphasis added).
146. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6408.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 6408-09 (noting that the line the CFPB is drawing is one that has long
been recognized as a rule of thumb to separate prime loans from subprime loans).

149. Id. at 6409.
150. Id.
151. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1404, 2141; see also Ability-to-Repay on Qualified
Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6416 (explaining that
Dodd-Frank creates special remedies for TILA violations).
152. Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending

Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6557.
153. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1413, 2148-49.
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ates a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.1 54 Collection of debt in connec-

tion with a residential mortgage loan also allows for this defense.s5 The
amount that may be recouped is equal to the amount a valid claim
brought in an original action, plus the consumer's costs in bringing the
action, and reasonable attorney's fee.1 56 What gives this defense real
bite, however, is the fact that there is not a time limitation to bring this
defense to a foreclosure action or a collection action.' 5 7 A consumer is
able to bring this defense even if the statute of limitation has expired in
regard to a private action and is able to recoup or set off the amount they
would have been entitled to if they had brought the action a day before
the expiration of the time limit on a private action.'5
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
WILL HAVE ON HOMEOWNERSHIP

A.

Dodd-Frank's Effect on Homeownership for All Consumers

With the changes presented in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act going into effect on January 10, 2014, the big
question that remains to be answered is, "[H]ow will Dodd-Frank affect
the mortgage industry and in turn homeownership in America?"' 5 9
There are two big impacts that Dodd-Frank's Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards will have on the mortgage market: they are going to make loans and banking more expensive for consumers and they
are going to decrease the amount of loans created.
It is true that section 1421(b)(2)(A)(vii) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act prevents the "total points and fees
. . . payable in connection with the loan [to] exceed 3 percent of the total
loan amount," however, lenders will need to offset this loss of income and

154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth
in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6416 (explaining the special statutory damages are limited
to three years of finance charges and fees).
157. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 1413, 2149 (stating when a "creditor, assignee,
or other holder of a mortgage loan, initiates a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure of the
residential mortgage loan . . . a consumer may assert a violation by a creditor . . . as a
matter of defense by recoupment or set off without regard for the time limit on a private
action for damages").
158. Id.
159. See Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass'n, Mortgage Reform in 2014 (Mar. 2014),
https://www.aba.com/Press/Documents/MortgageReform20l4.pdf
(outlining the many
changes bankers will need to take into account when Dodd-Frank goes into effect on January 10, 2014).
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consumers will be forced to pay more in alternate ways, such as servicing
fees, other areas and services provided and higher interest rates. 1 6 0 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have announced that the guarantee fees they
charge to lenders for servicing their thirty-year fixed-rate loans will rise
an average of fourteen basis points.16' A basis point is roughly 1/100th of
one percent and consumers, before Dodd-Frank and the Great Recession, used to pay approximately eleven to thirteen basis points.1 62 Now
consumers are paying around fifty basis points and experts are predicting
they could go as high as seventy to seventy-five basis points for a possible
fifty percent increase over the next two years.1 63 Bankers have already
stated that any fee increase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will likely be
passed along to consumers.' 6 4
Another effect of banks and lenders having mortgages tightly regulated
is that consumers will be paying new or higher fees in other banking activities.16' From the loss of free checking accounts, to the closing or reduction in credit cards and their limits, consumers in today's market are
hit with fees as high as twenty-five percent on a variety of bank products.1 6 6 As a result, a whole segment of the population-the one DoddFrank was intended to protect-is being pushed out of the mainstream
banking market and being corralled into much riskier, and financially
dangerous, nontraditional financial arrangements such as payday loans
and check cashers.1 6 7

160. Dodd-Frank,supra note 6, § 1412, 2146; see Janna Herron, Mortgage interest rates
continue uphill climb, LAS VEGAS REv.-J. (Dec. 28, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.reviewjour
nal.com/real-estate/mortgage-interest-rates-continue-uphill-climb
(emphasizing the increase in interest rates in preparation of the Dodd-Frank regulations).
161. Michele Lerner, The new mortgage rules that are likely to affect your next home
purchase, WASH. Posr (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/thenew-mortgage-rules-that-are-likely-to-affect-your-next-home-purchase/2013/12/12/756fec

90-5dba-1 1e3-beO7-006c776266edstory.html.
162. Id.
163. Id. It should be noted that if the expert predictions come true, the percentage
change between what consumers used to be charged and the possible changes in the coming years will equal a staggering 581.81 percent.
164. See Herron, supra note 160 (noting that when new rules from the Federal Housing Finance Agency increase the fee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge lenders to guarantee home loans, these costs will likely be passed on to consumers in the form or higher
interest rates).
165. See generally Abby McCloskey, Dodd-Frank's Costs Will Be Paid For By LowIncome Bank Customers, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspin/2013/09/26/dodd-franks-costs-will-be-paid-for-by-low-income-bank-customers
(discussing the various ways consumers will be charged because of the Dodd-Frank
regulations).

166. Id.
167. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 34

120

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 17:95

Another unintended consequence of capping the fees that are associated with loan origination and forcing banks to find other means of recouping cost will be higher mortgage interest rates for borrowers.1 68
Home mortgage rates began to increase in late 2013 in anticipation of the
Dodd-Frank regulations and were predicted to continue to rise in the first
quarter of 2014.169 Rates are expected to rise to above five percent in
2014, from around four percent at the end of 2013, and increase to
roughly five and a third percent by 2015, close to a twenty-eight percent
increase over two years.' 70 If this prediction is accurate it will mean that
for every $100,000 the average American borrower will pay an extra
$77.88 a month and an extra $20,040.16 of interest over the course of the
loan."' A higher interest rate, of course, is bad news for borrowers who
will still have to meet the forty-three percent debt-to-income threshold to
qualify for a loan.1 7 2
The biggest and most obvious change market analysts and other experts are predicting Dodd-Frank will have on the market is a decrease in
lending, with one expert predicting a decrease as high as twenty percent.17 3 The Mortgage Bankers Association believes that there will be a
thirty-two percent decrease in money used to write new mortgages. 1 74 It
is not hard to see why this is a possibility. Regulations by their very nature allow or stop some practice. In the case of Dodd-Frank, the regulations prevent certain lending practices from reaching a special status
(non-qualified mortgagees do not gain a presumption or safe harbor),
making loans that do not follow the regulations undesirable, such as lend-

168. See Herron, supra note 160 (highlighting reactions among banks, specifically increasing mortgage interest rates, in preparation of the Dodd-Frank regulations).

169. Id.
170. Reckard, supra note 67.
171. MORTGAGE CALCULATOR, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/mort
gage-calculator.aspxMSA=7240&MSA=7240&MSA=7240&MSA=7240&MSA=7240 (last
visited Oct. 6, 2014) (calculating a $100,000 mortgage at four percent and 5.3 percent and
subtracting the monthly totals and total interest from each other).
172. See Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lend-

ing Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6409 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026)
(stating the debt-to-income threshold to qualify as a qualified mortgage is forty-three
percent).
173. See Nick Timiraos, Study: New Mortgage Rules Could Shrink Lending By 20%,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/10/26/studynew-mortgage-rules-could-shrink-lending-by-20 (discussing the American Action Forum's
study that suggests pending mortgage regulations could result in nearly twenty percent
fewer mortgages being issued in the coming years, preventing home sales and
construction).
174. See Reckard, supra note 67 (stating the Mortgage Bankers Association "expects
to see $1.19 trillion in new mortgages written during 2014, down 32% from $1.75 trillion [in

2013]").
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ing to someone who has higher than a debt-to-income ratio of forty-three
percent or has a low credit score. 7 Banks will also hesitate to make new
mortgages because there are still a lot of unanswered questions about the
regulations passed by the CFPB, and they do not want to face the legal
ramifications of making non-Qualified Mortgages. 1 76 With mortgages being eight times as difficult to get now than they were pre-Great Recession,'1 7 7 the question becomes, "[I]f Dodd-Frank was meant to protect
consumers but is going to prevent a large portion of the population from
participating in homeownership, who is going to be excluded and is this
going to be acceptable?"
B.

Bearing the Brunt of the Consequences: Minorities and the Negative
Effects of Dodd-Frank

Barney Frank, co-sponsor of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection, is on the record saying that "it was a great mistake
to push lower-income people into housing they couldn't afford and
couldn't really handle once they had it." 1 7 8 Putting aside the political
question of big versus small government control, and how far should government protections should go, this statement speaks volumes for how
and whom the Dodd-Frank Act is meant to protect. The "how," as discussed supra, is by increasing the cost of mortgages and regulating the
market so that lenders write fewer mortgages and virtually eliminate the
smaller loans from being written. The "whom" is "lower-income people,"
which, when one looks at the demographics of race and income, is by and
large made up of the African-American and Hispanic minority groups. 7 9
The three major features of Dodd-Frank that will affect African-Ameri-

175. See generally Ability-to-Repay on Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the
Truth in Lending Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6408 (explaining the regulations Dodd-Frank imposed on mortgage lending).
176. See Megan Hopkins, Dodd-Frank impact on loan availability remains a concern,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM (June 18, 2013), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/dodd-frank-im
pact-loan-availability-remains-concern (discussing the possibility that some institutions
may stop all mortgage lending for some time because the risk is too great if regulations are

not complied with properly); see also
VEY:

IMPATT OF QUALIFIED

FANNIE MAE, MORTGAGE LENDER SENTIMEWr SURMORTGAGE RULES AND QUALIY CONTROL REVIEw 4

(2014), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/miss/pdf/miss-aug
2014-presentation.pdf (stating eighty percent of lenders surveyed do not plan to pursue
non-Qualified Mortgage loans).
177. Richard Satran, New, Tighter Mortgage Rules: Who's Squeezed Most?, U.S.
NEWS, http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2013/08/23/tighter-mortgage-rules-affordable-housing (last updated, Sept. 24, 2013, 1:36 PM).
178. Larry Kudlow, In Praise (!) of Barney Frank, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2010, 5:53 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/38791383.

179. See Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity, HENRY J.

KAISER FAMILY

FOUND., http:j/kff

.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnicity (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (demon-
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cans and Hispanics more than other racial and ethnic groups are the three
percent cost cap on loans, the forty-three percent debt-to-income ratio,
and the use of credit scores in the mortgage decision process.
One would think that a three percent cap on loan origination fees
would provide a really big win for the "little guy." No more fast-talking
salesman with a contract full of Greek, Latin, and legalese that hides the
dreaded hidden fees and costs of doing business with a giant corporation
that wants to take every last penny that it can get out of its customers.
Knowing the lender can only charge three percent is going to make everything better, right? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is "no."
Capping fees in this manner makes it more expensive for the bank to
create mortgages.1 8 Mortgages for $75,000 or less will be classified by
banks as "high-cost loans" where the risk to the bank is great and the
profit is low. People in the mortgage industry will simply stop making
these loans because the fees on writing such loans do not cover the actual
cost to the lender; the risk of losing money simply outweighs the monetary benefit that could be gained.1 8 ' Loans from $100,000 to $160,000 do
not fare any better because of the cap, and brokers will have trouble covering their costs and overhead in this price range, causing many in the
mortgage industry to go after only the higher-priced home mortgages
where they can get a better spread.' 8 2 This move away from smaller
mortgages is going to significantly impact African-Americans and Hispanics whose median home prices are $80,600 and $105,600 respectively,
which falls well under the $160,000 price point at which it is estimated the
fees will actually be profitable for mortgage brokers to write the loan.'
The second feature of Dodd-Frank, the forty-three percent debt-to-income threshold, is going to have two major impacts on minorities: first, a
large portion of people will not be able to qualify for a mortgage; and

strating that African-Americans and Hispanics make up thirty-five and thirty-three percent
respectively of those in poverty compared to thirteen percent of whites).
180. Tim Grant, New mortgage regulations will squeeze working-class buyers, PrrrsrURiIa
Posr-GAZITE (Oct. 9, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/businessnews/2013/10/09/New-mortgage-regulations-will-squeeze-working-class-buyers/stories/

201310090074.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. See ROBETw

L.

BENNEFIELD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME VA[.uus: 2000, at 3

(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-20.pdf (charting median
home prices by race and showing that African-Americans had a median home price of
$80,600 and Hispanics had a median home price of $105,600); see also Drew Desilver,
Black incomes are up, but wealth isn't, PEw RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/201 3 /08/30/black-incomes-are-up-but-wealth-isnt (stating the
average home value for a Black household is $75,040 as opposed to an average home value
for a White household at $217,150).
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second, it is going to limit the amount of money a person can borrow for
a mortgage, and for minorities may cause them to be priced out of the
market. Private research firms are predicting that ten to fifty percent of
borrowers who would have qualified for a mortgage in 2013 will not be
able to qualify for a loan with the Dodd-Frank in effect. 18 Even the
CFPB admits this as a likely outcome of the policy."'
To measure someone's debt-to-income ratio, a lender will calculate a
person's monthly debt repayments (including their prospective mortgage,
and any other loan or alimony payments they must make) and divide that
amount by their gross monthly income. This measurement is particularly
problematic for minority groups because, while minority groups carry
roughly the same amount of debt as white Americans,'" there is a clear
disparity in interest rates 87 and income levels."88 This means, of course,
that on average minorities will have higher debt-to-income ratios and,
because of this higher ratio, will not be able to qualify for mortgages at
higher percentage levels than their white counterparts. As a result of this
requirement, minorities will have to settle for smaller loans and presumably smaller houses in less desirable neighborhoods, and will more than
likely have a harder time finding a lender who will loan them money.' 8 9
The third aspect of Dodd-Frank that is going to cause problems for
minorities is the use of credit scores in the mortgage application process.
In a report to Congress, a study by the Federal Reserve found, "on average, blacks and Hispanics have lower credit scores than non-Hispanic
whites."' 9 0 While some argue there is no evidence that minorities face
negative impacts because credit scores are simply a prediction of the bor-

184. Satran, supra note 177.

185. Id.
186. See The Color of Debt: Credit Card Debt by Race and Ethnicity, DEMOS.ORG,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET TheColorofDebt_
Demos.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (illustrating that, on average, white Americans carry
$9,775 in credit card debt, Hispanics carry $10,002 in credit card debt, and African-Americans carry $7390 in credit card debt).
187. See id. (stating African-Americans paid an estimate seventeen percent annual
percentage rate, Hispanics an estimated sixteen annual percentage rate, and white Americans an average fourteen annual percentage rate).
188. See Table 697. Money Income of Families-Median Income by Race and Hispanic
Origin in Current and Constant (2009) Dollars: 1990 to 2009, CENSUS.Gov, http://www.cen
sus.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0697.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (diagraming
that the median income for white Americans was $62,545, African-Americans was $38,409,
and Hispanic Americans was $39,730).
189. See Grant, supra note 180 (explaining that lenders will be hesitant to loan money
because of the three percent cap on fees).
190. Boi. oi, GOVERNORS OF THU-E FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 39, at S-2.
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rowers future performance, 91 it is simple logic: if you make credit scores
a factor in deciding to loan to the public and, because one of the criteria
chosen to evaluate potential borrowers will cause certain racial and ethnic groups to be rejected more than another racial group, the criteria
probably needs to be reevaluated or changed.
V.

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECTS
CAUSED BY DODD-FRANK

Fair housing and lending cases are a developing area of the law, and
many of the issues associated with the topic are left ambiguous.1 9 2 in an
attempt to lessen the ambiguity, the Supreme Court has agreed in recent
years to hear two fair housing claims; however, before each case could be
brought before them, the parties settled.19 3 Without guidance on how to
interpret these cases, it is clear that large settlements and long drawn out
legal processes will plague lenders, cities, and the victims associated with
illegal fair housing and lending practices. 19 4
191. See generally Robert B. Avery et al., Does Credit Scoring Produce a Disparate
Impact? (Fin, and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-58, 2010), available at
(giving the opinion
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201058/201058pap.pdf
that credit scoring does not cause a disparate impact). It should be pointed out that information on race and credit scoring is very limited because credit models are proprietary and
the sample size used by the authors may be considered too small to see any actual effect.
192. Annmarie Billotti et al., Anatomy ofa Fair Housing Case: A Primer on Litigating
a Housing Discrimination Claim, 27 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 30, 32 (2009), available at http://
www.dfeh.ca.gov/res/docs/CivilRightsYear/Articles/AnatomyofAFairHousingCase.pdf.
193. See Adam Serwer, Mount Holly settlement spares Fair Housing Act-for now,
MSNBC (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/mount-holly-settlement-spares-fair-housing-act-for-now (explaining the settlement agreement reached in Mt.
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens before the case could reach the Supreme Court); see also Joe
Kimball, St. Paul withdraws Supreme Court appeal on key housing-code case, MINNPOST
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/two-cities/2012/02/st-paul-withdraws-supremecourt-appeal-key-housing-code-case (explaining the withdrawal of the city of St. Paul, Minnesota in the Supreme Court case of Gallagher v. Magner).
194. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Fin. Corp. (Dec.
21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html (recognizing a
$335 million settlement by Countrywide Financial Corporation after they engaged in discriminatory practices from 2004 to 2008 against African-American and Hispanic Borrowers); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches $21 Million Settlement to
Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortg. (May 31, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-695.html (discussing a $21 million settlement
agreed to by SunTrust Mortgage Inc., after they engaged in discriminatory practices from
2005 to 2009 against African-American and Hispanic Borrowers); Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches Settlement with C&F Mortg. Corp. to Resolve Allegations
of Lending Discrimination (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/September/
11-crt-1297.html (echoing the settlement agreement that C&F Mortgage Corporation will
pay, specifically $140,000, for discriminatory practices from 2007 to 2010); Press Release,
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With a conservative estimate of over four million fair housing law violations a year and between roughly 25,000 and 30,000 claims and complaints being filed with the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA), Fair
Housing Assistance Program (FHAP), and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), it is important to recognize the typical
form these complaints take.19 5 Common claims that fall under the heading of fair housing and lending are disparate impact, disparate treatment,
96
failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and sexual harassment.
Disparate treatment includes the practice of intentionally dealing with
persons differently because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability,19 7 while failure to provide reasonable accommodations usually
takes the form of certain rules, policies, practices, or services denying a
handicapped person "the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."" Finally, sexual harassment includes harassment "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter the conditions of the housing arrangement. 9 9
While disparate treatment, failure to provide reasonable accommodations
and sexual harassment claims are very important for creditors and lender

Dep't of Justice, Dep't. of Justice Reaches Settlement with Nat'l Mortg. Lender to Resolve
Allegations of Lending Discrimination (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
December/10-crt-1406.html (summarizing a settlement agreement that PrimeLending has
agreed to pay, specifically $2 million and modifications to their policies, for discriminatory
practices from 2006 to 2009); Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias
Charges, N.Y. TIMEs (July 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wellsfargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges.html?_r=0 (commenting on Well's Fargo
agreeing to pay a $175 million settlement agreement for discriminating against AfricanAmerican and Hispanic Borrowers between 2004 and 2009); Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
A.C.L.U. Sues Morgan Stanley Over Mortgage Loans, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 15, 2002), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/1 5/business/aclu-to-sue-morgan-stanley-over-mortgage-loans
.html?_r=0 (claiming that the American Civil Liberties Union is currently suing Morgan
Stanley for discriminatory practices against African-Americans).
195. NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, FAIR HOUSING IN A CHANGING NATION: 2012
FAIR HOUSING TRENDs REPORT 5-6 (2012), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing
.org/Portals/33/Fair%2OHousing%2OTrends%20Report%202012%20with%20date.pdf.
196. Anatomy of a Fair Housing Case, How. UNIV. SCI. oF L. FAIR Hous. CLINIC,
http://www.howardfairhousing.org/additionalresources/59/73 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014); see
also Billotti et al., supra note 192, at 32 (stating, in California, sexual harassment is also a
common claim under fair housing).
197. See BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 570-71 (10th ed. 2009) (defining disparate impact
as, "the adverse effect of a facially neutral practice (esp. an employment practice) that
nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or
disability and that is not justified by business necessity").
198. See Anatomy of a Fair Housing Case, supra note 196 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(explaining the reasons to bring a claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodations

by citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)).
199. See Billotti et al., supra note 192, at 32 (explaining how a person brings a claim
for sexual harassment in a fair housing case).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

31

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 34

THE SCHOLAR

126

[Vol. 17:95

to be aware of and take into account when dealing with Dodd-Frank, the
biggest worry is disparate impact claims. 2 0 0
There are very few areas within antidiscrimination law that have
brought about as much debate and argument as the disparate impact theory. 20 1 From its creation in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under Title
V11 2 0 2 to its development under Supreme Court precedent 203 and
strengthening under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,204 the disparate impact
theory has been a source of confusion for courts and scholars alike while
still being universally accepted.2 05 Whereas disparate impact theory is
largely developed in employment discrimination, disparate impact theory
claims under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly known
as the Fair Housing Act, are much less settled.20 6 Even though the CFPB
has claimed that "they do not expect lenders to run afoul of fair-lending
laws if they opt to issue only the most basic mortgages," 2 07 lenders, creditors, and mortgage originators have every right to be worried that they
may face these types of claims from both private individuals and the

200. See American Bankers Association et al., Request for Guidance and Clarity on
Disparate Impact and Dodd-Frank Mortgage Standards, ABA.com, (June 4, 2013), http://
www.aba.com/Advocacy/LetterstoCongress/Documents/130604joint trade-ltr-re-dispar
ate-impact.pdf (expressing fear of disparate impact claims against lenders that follow
Dodd-Frank).
201. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv.

701, 703 (2006).
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006) (corresponds to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241).
203. See Selmi, supra note 201, at 702-03 ("Together Griggs and Washington v. Davis
are widely seen as two of the most influential civil rights decisions ever issued. The Griggs
decision has been universally hailed as the most important development in employment
discrimination law."); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (finding
that a company's employment requirements of a high school diploma and an IQ test were
discriminatory); Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976) (declaring that a law is not
unconstitutional solely due to the fact it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless
of it reflecting a racially discriminatory reason).
204. See Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, 45 RuTcIE~is L. REV. 1011, 1014-19 (1993) (explaining the disparate impact
provisions enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
205. Lindsey E. Sacher, Through the Looking Glass and Beyond: The Future of Disparate Impact Doctrine Under Title VIII, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 603 (2011); see also
Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95
Micii. L. REV. 1668, 1693 (1997) (discussing the distinction between disparate impact and
affirmative action, and how conservatives fear that the disparate impact may become too
difficult to defend against and consequently lead to the use of affirmative action in
litigation).

206. Id.
207. U.S. Regulators Say No Fair-lending Problem With New Mortgage Rules,
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/22/financial-reg
ulation-fairlending-idUSLINOIC1DW20131022 (emphasis added).
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CFPB.2 08 As stated before, lenders, creditors, and mortgage originators
who face class action lending discrimination lawsuits can be charged with
multi-million dollar settlements.20 9
A.

DisparateImpact: What is it, Where Did it Come From, and How
Can a Lawyer Use it in Fair Housing and Lending
Complaints?
i.

The Beginnings of Disparate Impact: Griggs v. Dukes Power
Co. 210

Black's Law Dictionary defines disparate impact as "the adverse effect
of a facially neutral practice . . . that nonetheless discriminates against
persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability and
that is not justified by business necessity." 2 1 1 An example might be a fire
department that requires all of their firemen be six feet tall. A number of
men could satisfy this requirement but very few women could. The policy
could be attacked under a disparate impact theory because it is on its face
a neutral practice; however, the requirement will obviously exclude women, one of the protected classes established by the law.2 12

208. See

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,

CFPB

BULLETIN

2012-04

(FAIR LENDING),

at 3 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb bulletin-lending
discrimination.pdf (establishing that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will use
the legal doctrine of disparate impact in its exercise of its supervisory and enforcement
duties); see also Andrew R. Johnson, Regional Lenders Disclose Mortgage-Loan Probes,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9,2013, 12:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788
7323977304579000702161112162 (giving an example of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau implementing the legal doctrine of disparate impact in its investigation against
PNC Financial Group Inc. and SunTrust Banks Inc).
209. See, e.g. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Fin. Corp.,
supra note 194 (stating that the Justice Department had reached a $335 million settlement
for discriminatory lending practices by Countrywide Financial Corporation); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortg., supra note 194 (discussing a $21
million settlement against Suntrust Mortgage for allegations of lending discrimination);
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches Settlement with C&F Mortg. Corp.
to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination, supra note 194 (discussing a $140,000
settlement against C&F Mortgage corporation for allegations of discriminatory lending);
see also Press Release, Dep't. of Justice, Dep't. of Justice Reaches Settlement with Nat'l.
Mortg. Lender to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination, supra note 194 (discussing an agreement by PrimeLending to pay $2 million to settle claims of discriminatory
lending).

210. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
211. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 197, at 570-71.
212. See Satya Thallum et al., Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Establish Discrimination in Lending, 9 J.L. ECON. & Pot'v 417, 419 (2013) (using the six foot fire fighter
requirement policy as an example for disparate impact).
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The legal doctrine of disparate impact made its debut in 1971 in the
landmark Supreme Court case Griggs v. Dukes Power Co. 2 1 3 In Griggs,
the Supreme Court analyzed whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibited employers from requiring such things as high school diplomas and passage of standardize general intelligence tests, as conditions of employment or transfers to other jobs within the company.2 14
The defendants in the suit, Duke Power Company from North Carolina,
had intentionally segregated its workforce so "no Negro had ever held a
position [in the company] in any department other than the Labor Department," by instituting a policy nine years prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requiring a high school education, or its
equivalent, in order to be hired or to advance to other departments
within the company.215 iI response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke
Power Company amended this policy to allow employees who had
worked for the company prior to September 1, 1965 to become eligible if
they passed two standardized tests by achieving a score equivalent to the
average high school graduate.2 16
The plaintiffs in Griggs argued that the requirement to pass the two
tests "operated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number
of Negroes" and was "unlawful under Title VII unless shown to be job
related." 2 1 7
In its holding, the Court focuses on the two prong objective of Congress when it created Title VII: equality in employment opportunities and
the removal of obstacles that had operated in the past to discriminate
against African-Americans and other nonwhite minorities in favor of
white employees. 2 1 8 The Court explained, "[u]nder the Act, practices,
procedures, or test neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory intent." 2 1 9 In other words, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prevents overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form
but discriminatory in operation. 2 2 o This, however, does not mean that
those persons who belong to a group that had formerly been discrimi-

213. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
214. Id. at 425-26 (1971).

215. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (4th Cir. 1970).
216. Id. at 1229.
217. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
218. See id. at 429-30 ("The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees.").
219. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).

220. Id. at 431.
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nated against would be given a guaranteed job; the Act simply requires
"the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification." 2 2 1 An employer can avoid
claims such as these if the practice can reasonably be shown to be a business necessity relating to job performance.2 22 Consequently, because
Duke Power Company could not demonstrate that the two tests requiring
passage were a reasonable measure of the job performance or a business
necessity, the Court ruled that it had violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964.223
ii.

Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing and Lending Claims

As stated supra, disparate impact theory is largely developed in employment discrimination, and while it has been expanded to include
claims under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (commonly known
as the Fair Housing Act) the validity of the theory is much less settled in
those types of cases. 2 2 4 The purpose of the Fair Housing Act is to "provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States." 2 25 The Act prohibits discrimination in housing on
grounds not only of race but also of "color, religion, sex, familial status
and national origin." 2 2 6 Promulgating the Act was one of the ways that
Congress responded to severe societal pressures and rioting in urban areas caused by "economic deprivation, social isolation, and psychological
alienation" of African-Americans during the 1960s.227
In passing the Fair Housing Act, Congress eliminated discriminatory
practices in housing, adding one more prohibition to the list of discriminatory practices they had already outlawed in the areas of voting, educa-

221. Id. at 430-431.
222. Id. at 431.

223. Id. at 436.
224. Sacher, supra note 205, at 603.

225. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
226. Id. at § 3604(a) ("it [is] unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or nationalorigin") (emphasis added).
227. See Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year "First Step": The Fair Housing
Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 CoLum. L. Riv. 1617, 1622 (2007)
(discussing the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (popularly known as the
"Kerner Commission"), created by President Lyndon Johnson to understand factors contributing to civil unrest in the 1960s, which concluded "[a]ll Americans sought both the
material assets of the capitalist system and its subsequent psychological benefits of dignity
and peace of mind ...
[but] neither of these two American aspirations was attainable for
the majority of black households").
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tion, public accommodation, and employment.22 8 The legislative history
makes clear that Congress intended the Act to end discrimination in
housing practices by strategically targeting middle-class African-Americans by extending equal opportunities in housing choice and orchestrating integrated living patterns. 2 2 9 To meet these goals, the Act provides a
victim of housing and fair lending discrimination standing to file a lawsuit
to seek relief from injuries and damages suffered from the
discrimination.2 30
The Fair Housing Act has three major impacts on the housing market.23 1 First, it prohibited sellers and renters from discriminating in transactions.2 32 Second, the Act prevented intermediary actors, such as real
estate agents and mortgage brokers, from discriminating in their assistance of transactions.23 3 Third, the Act commanded the Federal Government to affirmatively promote fair housing by making the Secretary for
Housing and Urban Development responsible for investigating complaints and empowering the Attorney General to bring suits against those
who engage in discrimination.2 34
Even though the Supreme Court has recently granted review of two
fair housing disparate impact cases,2 35 both of which had been dismissed

228. See 114 CONG. Rjic. 3421-22 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale) (noting
that housing was one of the major sectors of American life where discrimination remained,
and that fair housing needed to be added to the list of discriminatory practices outlawed by
Congress thus "achieving equality in opportunity and education for the Negro").
229. Larkin, supra note 227, at 1625; see also 114 CONG. REc. 2279 (statement of Sen.
Edward Brooke) ("Fair housing [choice and opportunity] does not promise to end the
ghetto . . . but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to escape."); Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of FairHousing,
82 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 874, 919-21 (1988) (arguing that one reason for the Act was a belief that
removing discrimination was essential for creating an economic and political environment
in which integration could develop).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612-13 (2006) (providing in detail how and why a person can
file a claim under the Fair Housing Act).
231. See Sander, supra note 229, at 880 (explaining the Fair Housing Act "created a
three-pronged attack upon housing discrimination").
232. Id.; see also § 3604 (making it illegal to "discriminate against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin").
233. Sander, supra note 229, at 880; see also § 3608 (prohibiting intermediary actors
associated with the buyer, seller, or renter from discriminating against said parties).
234. Id.; see also § 3610 (describing in detail the duties and powers given to the Secretary for Housing and Urban Development and to the Attorney General to investigate and
prosecute housing discrimination).
235. Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), and cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Magner
v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and cert. dismissed,

132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
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before being heard due to settlement by the parties out of court,23 6 the
Court's decision in Metropolitan Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington suggests that, if confronted with a disparate impact claim under Title
VIII, the Court would recognize the claim. 2 37 In addition to this inference, all of the circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether it is
possible to use the theory, and all agree the Fair Housing Act of 1968
allows for the use of the disparate impact theory in fair housing and lending cases. 2 3 8
There are three camps in which a circuit court finds itself with regard to
methods for testing disparate impact claims: the Seventh Circuit Balancing Test, the Third Circuit Burden Shifting Test, and the undecided camp
of the Fifth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and D.C. Circuit that would allow

236. See Serwer, supra note 193 (explaining the settlement agreement reached in Mt.
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens before the case could reach the Supreme Court); see also Kimball, supra note 193 (explaining the withdrawal of the city of St. Paul, Minnesota in the
Supreme Court case of Gallagher v. Magner).
237. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-67,
271 (1977) (commenting on the unorthodox approach of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case for "further consideration of respondent's statutory [Title VIII] claims").
238. See Sacher, supra note 205, at 603-04 (citing various cases to show that all federal
district courts have affirmed the use of disparate impact in fair housing and lending cases);
see also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000) (recognizing
the consensus among circuit courts that the "Fair Housing Act prohibits actions that have
and unjustified disparate racial impact"); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing the practical concern of looking at the
intent behind a facially neutral law that may result in disparate impact cases); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding that urban renewal
activities had essentially removed all black families from the area, creating an all-white
community and therefore providing evidence of discrimination); Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988-99 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding the case to the lower court to reevaluate whether there is a prima facie case of discriminatory impact); United States v.
Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that the "Fair Housing Act prohibits
not only direct discrimination but practices with racially discouraging effects"); Arthur v.
City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying three of the four factors from
the Seventh Circuit Test to determine the discriminatory effect); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.
v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying a four factor test
to determine the presence of disparate impact); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth.,
342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing disparate impact as it relates to Oti Kaga's

allegations); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing the Seventh
Circuit's four factor test and determining that the court is not required to show a strong
showings of all four factors); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1234,
1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995) (identifying the relationship that disparate impact and disparate
treatment have with regard to discrimination cases); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21
F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying the disparate income theory to determine that
discriminatory effects were present); Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d
1227, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing Section 813(c) of the Fair Housing Act).
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disparate impact claims under Title VIII but have not decided the proper
test to analyze the claims under.23 9
The Seventh Circuit Balancing Test was established in Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington
Heights 11)240 and has been reevaluated and modified by the Second,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.

241

In Arlington Heights II, the Seventh Circuit

identified the four factors a court should balance when assessing a disparate impact claim:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect;
(2) is there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not
enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis;
(3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained
of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or merely to
restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners who wish to provide such housing.2 42
Under the first factor, a plaintiff in a fair housing violation claim can
challenge a facially neutral decision by showing at least one of the two
kinds of discriminatory effects.24 3 The first type of discriminatory effect
is a showing that the decision has a greater effect on one minority group
over another, and the second type is based on how it affects the community.24 4 For example, if the decision perpetuates segregation within a
community, thereby violating the goal of the Fair Housing Act and affecting the community as a whole, it does not matter the extent the disparate
effect has on different racial groups.2 45 It is important to note that conduct adversely affecting both whites and minorities is not an obstacle to

239. See John W. McGee, Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens: Disparate Impact and The
Fair Housing Act, 41 REAL EsTr. L.J. 429, 440-46 (2013) (explaining how each circuit tests
disparate impact claims).
240. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, 1290.
241. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-36
(2d Cir. 1988) (stating that the four factors should be "considered in a final determination
on the merits rather than as a requirement for a prima facie case"); see also Arthur, 782
F.2d at 575 (adopting the first, third and fourth factors from the Seventh Circuit's Balancing Test); Mountain Side Mobile Estates, 56 F.3d at 1252 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting a modified version of the Seventh Circuit Balancing Test by rejecting the second factor in the
Seventh Circuit Test).
242. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, 1290.
243. Id.
244. Id.

245. Id.
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recovery, and what will be analyzed and considered by the court is the
strength of the discriminatory effect.2 46
The second criterion, whether there is some evidence of discriminatory
intent, when analyzed under the Seventh Circuit Balancing Test is considered by the court to be the least important.2 47 The reason the court takes
this view is because "discriminatory intent before relief can be granted
. .. is often a burden that is impossible to satisfy" and a "strict focus on
intent" could allow discrimination to go unpunished in the absence of
racism.248 This factor is considered so unimportant that when the Second
Circuit adopted this test in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, it rejected this criterion altogether. 2 4 9
The third factor a court using the Seventh Circuit Balancing Test must
take into consideration is the defendant's interest in taking the action that
caused a discriminatory effect. This element largely revolves around
whether a person, private entity, or governmental entity is acting within a
legally protected right or scope of authority.25 0 If they are acting in the
capacity, the court is less likely to find an action to violate the Fair Housing Act.25 1
The final issue to consider when using the Seventh Circuit Test is to
determine and weigh the relief that the plaintiff is seeking. 2 52 If the
plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to take affirmative action,
such as compelling the defendant to construct integrated housing or utilize his own land for a particular purpose, the court should be reluctant to
grant relief; to do so would be a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy. 253 However, if the plaintiff is seeking to prevent the defendant
from interfering with their attempts to build integrated housing on their
own land, the court should be more willing to grant relief.2 5 4

246. See id. at 1291 (finding that the plaintiffs claim is "relatively weak" or at least
hard to determine with regard to the discriminatory effect, however, the court does not
rule out the plaintiff's claim because either an entire minority group is not discriminated
against or because only whites are affected).
247. Id. at 1292.
248. Id. at 1290.
249. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.

1988).
250. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (giving examples of when a
court is likely to find a violation of the Fair Housing Act).

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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The Burden Shifting Test, first introduced by the Third Circuit in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo 2 55 and adopted in various forms by the
First,2 56 Fourth,2 57 Eighth,25 8 and Ninth Circuits,2 59 is based on a test established for Title VII employment discrimination cases.2 60 In a case
under the Burden Shifting Test a "plaintiff makes a prima facie case by
showing a statistical discriminatory impact. "261 The burden of proof then
shifts to the defendant who must show "both a justification which serves a
legitimate, bona fide interest and that no alternative course of action
could be adopted that would enable the interest to be served with less
discriminatory impact."262 In the modified versions of this test established by the Eighth and Ninth Circuit, if the defendant can provide a
justification, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show an alternative that is less discriminatory but serves the same purpose.26 3
B.

Formally Adding Teeth to Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act: The Department of Housing and Urban
Development's DiscriminatoryEffect Rule

In February 2013, disparate impact claims received a huge boost from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Implementation of the FairHousing Act's DiscriminatoryEffect Standard;Final
Rule.2 6 4 This final rule formalized HUD's "long-held interpretation of
the availability of 'Discriminatory effects' liability under the Fair Housing
Act" by establishing a three-part burden-shifting test.26 5 Under this test,
the plaintiff first has the duty to prove a prima facie case that a practice

255. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (merging Supreme
Court tests for discriminatory effect).
256. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding residential
preference alone, absent intentional discrimination, is not a violation of Fair Housing Act).
257. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a defendant in a discriminatory impact housing case must show a "business necessity sufficiently compelling" to justify policy).
258. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming
lower court decision that adverse impact on a protected minority group is not enough on
its own to show that the policy impacts disparately).
259. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the city violated the
Fair Housing Act because practice adversely effected low-income citizens only).
260. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (using Title VII as a guide to a Title VII claim).
261. McGee, supra note 239, at 442-43.

262. Id.
263. Id. at 443.
264. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (discussing how the
Department of Housing and Urban Development has "interpreted and enforced the Fair
Housing Act").
265. Id. at 11460.
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"results in, or would predictably result in, a discriminatory effect on the
basis of a protected characteristic." 26 6 If this is done, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant who must then prove that the discriminatory practice from the plaintiff's prima facie case is "necessary to achieve one or
more of its substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests." 2 6 7 If the
defendant can satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff can still establish liability if they can prove the "substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest could be served by a practice that has a less discriminatory
effect." 2 6 8
While the final rule seemingly helps to clear the split among the circuit
courts over what test to use in fair housing disparate impact claims, it did
not resolve the uncertainty the mortgage lending industry has surrounding disparate impact liability and compliance with Dodd-Frank. HUD
notes that commentators expressed concern that the rule could lead to
lawsuits for lenders who comply with Dodd-Frank and its requirements of
using credit scores and other underwriting criteria. 2 6 9 Unfortunately,
HUD declined to offer assurance that lenders would be protected for
their compliance of the Ability-to-Repay Standard or Qualified Mortgage
Standard and instead opined, without any rationale, that it does not believe the new rule will prompt any lawsuits challenging compliance with
Dodd-Frank.2 7 0 It has since reiterated that this rule is simply a long-existing standard held by the federal courts of appeal and has been recognized by the mortgage lending industry for at least the past eighteen
years.27 1
VI.

A

MODEST PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE REGULATION

Based on this research, it appears clear that the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank regulations will increase the calls for revision
or outright repeal of Dodd-Frank. As the pendulum of regulation has
swung far in the direction of overregulation, any attempts towards deregulation should be examined to determine if they are moving the pendulum too far to the underregulation side.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 11475-76 (listing the various issues that many commentators believe will
arise from the practices the rule may create).
270. See id. (explaining that the mortgage lending industry has recognized disparate
impact claims-since, at the very least, the creation of the Joint Policy Statement-and
detailing HUD's rationale for choosing not to minimize lender liability).
271. See id. (explaining that the mortgage lending industry has recognized disparate
impact claims-since, at the very least, the creation of the Joint Policy Statement-and
detailing HUD's rationale for choosing not to minimize lender liability).
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We are not calling for the repeal of all regulation with respect to housing in the United States; those that call for a full "free market" overlook
that such markets only achieve their equilibrium when there is full knowledge, low barriers to entry and exit, fungible products, a large number of
firms relative to the market, and a complete mobility of buyers and sellers
in the market.2 72 The market for housing loans has relatively few of these
characteristics, so a call to completely deregulate the market would be
untenable. Likewise removing all responsibility for the loans made by
lenders or the personal responsibility of the borrower to borrow responsibly is equally untenable. We also recognize that a wholesale repeal of
the Ability-to-Repay regulations is unrealistic. However, there are certain provisions that could be modified to better serve the housing market.
First, we propose a different standard for determining when a consumer could bring an action against a lender. While it sounds appropriate
to make it a "reasonable" basis for determining that a consumer had a
"reasonable" ability to repay the loan, this standard is far too vague to
put into practice in today's automated world. Lenders will most certainly
not venture into loans that are not subject to the safe harbor (at least in
the short term). 27 3 Instead, lenders will only write "qualified loans" and
only to the most qualified borrowers. 27 4 This restricts the markets ability
to innovate and design new products to meet demand, and eliminates a
whole segment of the market that may, as a whole, be both responsible
and profitable.
We suggest that the safe harbor be established for not just the product
characteristics but also for the underwriting characteristics. For example,
a scale of "points" could be established that provides a number of points
for each characteristic. Borrowers scoring high enough would be subject
to the safe harbor, while those below a certain point, could be required to
bring on additional co-signers, put more money down, or maintain a balance in an account to cover deficiencies. The lending industry uses a very
similar type of underwriting system now to determine interest rates and
even the eligibility of borrowers. Incorporating such a system should
neither be too costly for lenders, nor overly difficult to regulate.

272. See Perfect Competition, AMosWEB

ENCYCLONOMIC

WEBPEDIA,

http://www

.amosweb.com/cgi-bin/awb-nav.pl?s=wpd&c=dsp&k=perfect+competition
(last visited
Oct. 26, 2014) (defining "perfect competition" as "[a]n ideal market structure characterized
by a large number of small firms, identical products sold by all firms, freedom of entry into
and exit out of the industry, and perfect knowledge of prices and technology").

273. See

FANNIE MAE,

supra note 176, at 4.

274. See id. at 7-8 (stating eighty-four percent of lenders surveyed expect ninety percent or more of their loans to be Qualified Mortgages, and only six percent of lenders
surveyed are expecting to ease credit standards in the near future).
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Second, we propose that lenders be required to retain some responsibility for the loans they make by requiring that they retain a certain percentage of the risk of default on the loans. Lenders should be required to
maintain certain capital reserve requirements, much like insurers are required to do today, and the investments of those capital reserves should
be sufficiently diversified (and stable) to be able to handle the inevitable
downturns. Penalties should be in the hands of regulators, not in the
hands of the borrower or their attorneys.
Third, we also believe that those firms that are "too big to fail" should
be broken up into smaller companies similar to the breakup of the Bell
telephone system in 1982-1984.275 This would lessen the risk that any
one company would be able to affect the market, and spread the risk of
widespread default in any one type of loan to more firms.
Fourth, borrowers that execute a "strategic default" should be pursued
by the lenders or by the regulators for the agreement they made, perhaps
through the tax mechanisms.
Finally, mandatory education should be required for each first-time
homebuyer. Borrowers should bear at least some responsibility to determine if a loan is appropriate for them. To fund education and other social
programs to assist homeowners, a surcharge could be placed on each loan
written.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Thomas Jefferson once said, "The political institutions of America, its
various soils and climates, opened a certain resource to the unfortunate
and to the enterprising of every country and insured to them the acquisition and free possession of property."27 6 Unfortunately, the political institutions that Thomas Jefferson spoke of have changed course. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is going
to change the very core of the United States of America. The "American
Dream" of owning a home is going to be very difficult for lower and
middle class families to achieve and there is going to be a disparate impact felt by minorities in conjunction with the regulations lenders will
need to follow to be in compliance with the Ability-To-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards.

275. See generally Bob Adelmann, The Breakup of Ma Bell, THE Nrw AMERICAN
(May 12, 2010), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/sectors/item/4297-the-breakupof-ma-bell (describing the rise of the Bell system to monopoly status, and then further
discussing its breakup in 1984).
276. Thomas Jefferson, The Declarationon Taking Arms: July 6, 1775, in JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGREss (1775), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l8thcentu
ry/contcong_07-06-75.asp.
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There is still a chance that these segments of society will be able to
fight back in the courtroom. Even with HUD's formalization of a disparate impact theory of liability under the Fair Housing Act, there are still
several questions and issues that need to be resolved before any litigant
will be successful in a courtroom. Specifically, courts will need to answer
and resolve issues surrounding how to properly evaluate whether a disparate impact exists, what will qualify as a "substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest," 2 77 whether Title VIII challenges will be able to
overcome the missing provisions that are present in Title VII, and how
the ruling and interpretation on certifying a class in class action lawsuits
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes 2 7 8 affects these type of claims. In any event, the
changes and damage that Dodd-Frank has caused to the American
Dream will be felt for years to come.

277. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78

Fed. Reg. 11460, 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
278. Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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